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All Quiet on the West German Front?

All Quiet on the West German Front?
Changes in East German Political
Agitation in Western Germany, 1945-1955
Cornell Overfield
Introduction
To many early scholars, the Cold War epitomized bipolarity – between the United States and Soviet Union, between
communism and capitalism, between liberty and totalitarianism, between east and west. Beginning in 1991, however, scholarship informed by temporal distance and unlocked archives,
has thrown such strict bipolarities into doubt and recognized
the agency of the superpowers’ allies and satellites in the Cold
War. These diverse parties, notably East Germany, waged political warfare using all means short of conventional war to win an
existential ideological conflict. One of the most persistent tactics
focused on mobilizing foreign populations through propaganda,
agitation and organization. Previous studies of East German attempts to influence West Germany have focused on the late Cold
War, particularly the 1970s and 1980s, leaving the early Cold
War largely unstudied.1 To fill that gap, this paper asks how East
Germans participated in the Cold War’s non-violent conflict as
Marxists, and as Germans, in the decade from 1945 until 1955.
Drawing on East German archives, this paper appraises East German rhetoric towards West Germans as agitation, which targeted
foreign audiences with a combination of propaganda and calls to
action.
The communist and German identities of East German
leaders are crucial for understanding the complex and evolving
approach leaders took to agitation in West Germany. On one
hand, common perceptions of Soviet propaganda and agitation
assume that the gospels of Marx and Lenin produced efforts
68
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which harped on common communist themes and targeted the
working class and minorities. On the other hand, historians, including Eric Hobsbawm, Benedict Anderson and others, have
observed that leftists in the Marxist and anti-colonialist movements reclaimed nationalism and patriotism for their own uses
after World War II.2 The horrors perpetrated by fascists discredited the right’s claim to the nation for most of the world. At the
same time, the Soviet Union, the left’s standard bearer, found
traditional devices of Russian nationalism useful for motivating
its population through the brutal demands of the Great Patriotic
War.3 As the global communist left rehabilitated nationalism, did
they inject it into their agitation when appropriate, as it was the
case in a divided Germany? If they did, would they be willing
to instrumentalize German nationalism, undoubtedly the most
tainted of all national traditions in the post-1945 era?
In the decade following the war, the East Germans
adapted their agitational rhetoric in West Germany in response
to changes at home and abroad. This investigation, based on East
German archives, demonstrates that East German agitation from
1945 to 1955 initially conformed with the stereotypical vision of
Soviet-bloc agitation as promoting socialist unity through communist parties. However, 1948 and 1949 brought shifting political objectives in the Soviet zone and Germany’s formal division
into the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG or West Germany)
and the German Democratic Republic (GDR or East Germany).
German national unity and peace became the twin goals for East
German agitation and movements in West Germany. Only four
years after the horrors of Auschwitz, East German operations to
influence West Germans consistently employed rhetoric prioritizing the sanctity of the German nation over traditional communist objectives. Beginning in 1949, the National Front, a new
umbrella political group based in East Germany, served as the
most important vehicle for delivering new messages emphasizing
national unity and peace to West Germans through its operations
in West and East Germany. After 1952, East German agitation
Penn History Review
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retained its language of reunification, but it focused more narrowly on spurring West Germans to oppose various treaties under consideration by the West German parliament.
Rhetoric in 1945-1948: Agitating for Socialist Unity
On May 8, 1945, World War II in Europe ended, and a
shattered Germany faced an unclear future. The country, under
the control of the war’s victors, had the potential to break with
the Nazi period, sweep away tradition, and refashion society.4
The mix of uncertainty and possibility fueled debate, about how
the left ought to proceed in the Soviet zone and Germany, between three dominant political groups: Walter Ulbricht’s clique,
which boasted Soviet backing, the ultra-leftists, and the “unionists.” The influence of Soviet military occupation authorities ensured that these disagreements temporarily resolved in favor of
Ulbricht, who advanced Soviet demands for policies focused on
unifying working-class parties. This section begins by examining
the resolution of this debate, including the repudiation of both
the radical leftists and the “unionists,” denounced by Soviets as
nationalist. It then examines how East German rhetoric in and
towards the Western zones reflected a consolidation around socialist unity and working-class unity before this message started
to break down in 1948. During these years, leaders in the Soviet
zone depended heavily on the Communist Party (KPD) as the
vehicle for organizing agitation in the western zones, while information efforts slowly gathered steam in the form of papers, radio
broadcasts and providing materials to the KPD.
Coalescing Around Socialist Unity
As the German left experienced a post-war renaissance,
three strands emerged contesting the primary concern for the
leftist program in Germany, particularly in the Soviet zone. These
factions were: the ultra-leftists, the “Muscovites,” and the union70

Cornell Overfield

All Quiet on the West German Front?

ists. Although their debate immediately grappled with the implementation of leftism in regions under direct Soviet control,
neither Soviets nor Germans seemed to plan for Germany’s division.5 Thus, the debate was not one whose resolution would or
could be constrained to the Soviet zone. Ulbricht’s victory propelled rhetoric and techniques designed to build a unified leftist
movement across Germany but controlled by the future rulers of
East Germany.
Ultra-leftists emerged from the rubble of the Third Reich
ready to immediately build new, local-level workers’ paradises.
Drawing heavily from leftists who weathered the war in Germany, this disorganized strain sought to take advantage of society’s
near-total destruction to immediately deliver on the long-awaited
worker control of local industry and politics. The “Muscovites”
were the small clique of German communists, including key future leaders such as Walter Ulbricht and Wilhelm Pieck, who had
spent the war under the Soviet Union’s protection and returned
to Germany in the war’s final days as Soviet proxies. They were
singularly concerned during these years with reestablishing order,
maintaining their status in Soviet eyes and entrenching Soviet
control over the zone. The third strand, the “unionists,” emerged
in 1946 in response to early signs that Germany might be headed
towards division. They argued that the left’s primary goal should
be ensuring German unity above everything else.
The Soviet Union played a key role in the suppression
of the ultra-leftists and the crystallization around socialist unity
in 1946. In the vacuum left by the collapse of the Nazi government, the ultra-leftists in some towns in eastern Germany set
about building local administrations featuring red flags, worker
leadership and leftist greetings and anthems. Although local Soviet military authorities sometimes tolerated these experiments,
as the Soviet occupation grew more organized, senior officers ordered the experiments be curtailed in preference for administrations less alienating to non-communist Germans. By the end of
1945, pressure from the Soviet military occupation had dismanPenn History Review
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tled most projects deemed overly radical.6 Throughout 1945,
the Soviet Union and their Muscovite proxies also suppressed
spontaneous drives for socialist unity, much to the confusion of
ultra-radicals, and maintained that the Social Democratic Party
of Germany (SPD) would survive as an independent party. However, early election results elsewhere in Central Europe returned
results favoring social democrats over communists, casting doubt
on the KPD’s ability to win Soviet zone elections as a stand-alone
party. Thus, in 1946, Soviet authorities and their German lackeys abruptly changed course to ensure that Soviet proxies would
remain in control in the eastern zone; instead of suppressing the
left’s impulse to unify, they now forced a union at gun-point. After a hotly-contested deliberation, the Soviet-zone SPD split with
the party in the other three zones and elected to unify with the
KPD to create the Socialist Unity Party of Germany (SED).7 The
SED gradually became a vehicle for Ulbricht and his successors
to rule East Germany, but immediately following its establishment, it retained a significant role for the SPD and aspirations to
spread to the American, British and French zones.
Between 1946 and 1948, the Soviet authorities successfully suppressed unionist dissenters, who challenged the growing
emphasis on socialist unity as a threat to Germany’s national unity. After the SED’s establishment, the unionists argued in a series
of public articles and private discussions that the German left
should prioritize German unity, asserting that a unique German
road to socialism required a singular Germany. These unionists,
more so than the ultra-leftists, offered an alternative vision for
agitation in the non-Soviet zones, preferring rhetoric and action
designed to promote German unity, even if this compromised
the nascent socialist unity project.
Sergei Tiul’panov, the director of propaganda for the
Soviet Military Administration of Germany, led the charge
against unionist campaigns. Even before the unionists emerged,
Tiul’panov instructed the SED to avoid any hint of nationalism
and repeatedly lectured the Muscovites about the importance of
72
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hewing to a Soviet interpretation of Marxism-Leninism. When
the unionists leveled their challenge against the socialist unity
project, Tiul’panov derided the “German road” to socialism as
“residual nationalism and chauvinism.”8 By the end of 1946,
unionist ideas fell by the wayside in both Soviet directions for
and the German practice of agitation in the western zones. By
the end of 1946, the unionists had been marginalized in communist agitation in the western zones. In January 1947, senior
Soviet leaders summoned their German proxies to a meeting in
Moscow, described by Naimark as the most important of this
period. Here, Josef Stalin and Vyacheslav Molotov directed the
Germans to intensify the struggle for the German working class
in the western zones.9
Socialist Unity in Walter Ulbricht’s Files
In 1947, acting on Stalin’s directions, Walter Ulbricht
and other senior Muscovites launched a rhetorical campaign
emphasizing socialist unity. Speaking to officials in the western
zones, they advocated a merger of the western SPD and western
KPD into a single socialist party – replicating the model presented by the SED in the Soviet zone.10 Reports from and about
West Germany also focused on the state of the left, particularly
whether it trended towards unification or fragmentation. The
SED’s work in the west (Westarbeit) during this year targeted the
Western occupiers when appropriate, but primarily focused on
other leftist elements perceived as barriers to a unified socialist
unity.
In April 1947, Walter Ulbricht traveled to Frankfurt am
Main in the American sector to participate in a KPD conference
preparing for zone elections. His speech covered “the Moscow
conference and the fight for unity and the democratization of
Germany,” but Ulbricht’s earlier letters coordinating his appearance made it clear that “unity” (Einheit) involved the working
class, rather than the German state or nation. This corresponPenn History Review
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Walter Ulbricht with Mao and Stalin at a ceremony arranged
for Stalin’s 71st birthday in Moscow

dence discussed unity only in the context of the political parties
representing the working class in the western zones, noting that
the SED’s work in those zones should unite the working class’
political representation.11 Thus, “unity...of Germany” meant
uniform SED representation throughout Germany. Likewise, a
joint SED-KPD pronouncement issued after that conference,
and addressed to the working class, discussed “all of Germany”
(ganz Deutschland), but only insofar as the SED should replace
the SPD and KPD as the representative for the working class.
This quasi-program, proposing a range of policies associated with
the left, including drastic land reform, cooperative control over
businesses and gender equality, concluded with the statement:
“prepare to achieve the SED in all of Germany.”12
SED reports from later in 1947 and early in 1948 testified to the party’s focus on unifying the working class and its
political parties, even if questions such as German national unity
occasionally intruded. One report from mid-1947, surveying
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the SED’s development in the western zones, blamed the SPD
party leadership, and to a lesser extent, the American, French
and British military governments, for stifling the socialist unification movement. It also noted that a committee coordinating
KPD-SED cooperation was established in February 1947 with
the primary task of overcoming division and achieving unity, not
of Germany as a whole, but of the German working class and
socialist movement.13 The committee’s principal task was achieving socialist unity, and its principal foes those West German leftists resisting East German campaigns, rather than the occupying
powers who would oversee Germany’s division. One year later,
reports on a “friends of unity conference” in the western zones
discussed using this occasion to foster links between the KPD
and other socialist parties, particularly the SPD, to create a quasiSED.14 Although references to national unity occasionally peppered these and other documents from this period, those writing
SED reports and planning SED agitation in the western zones
sidelined this issue in favor of a different kind of unity – that of
the working class and its political parties.
Between 1946 and 1948, the SED ignored the official
division between itself and the KPD and instead directed the
KPD in the western zones to emphasize the socialist unity project in its own elections and campaigns. Although the debate between German unity and socialist unity had already begun in
the Soviet zone, the SED’s directions to the West German KPD
largely ignored or marginalized the question of Germany’s future
unity. Guidelines issued to the KPD in the British zone observed
that conditions were ripe for unifying the working class in this
zone and instructed the party to work towards this goal. An afteraction report on the well-documented British zone elections also
praised the range of campaigns and slogans developed for the
election, which either promoted socialism or attacked the leaders
of other parties, but never touched the issue of German unification. Reflecting the East Germans’ overwhelming concern with
opposition in the SPD’s senior leadership, the guidelines remindPenn History Review
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ed the recipients to construe the SPD’s leadership as ignoring the
working-class’ interests whenever possible. The SED’s officials
did aspire to foster positive relations between the KPD and SPD
wherever possible. Memos discussing election outcomes and parliamentary interactions between the KPD and SPD celebrated
that “objective” (i.e. positive) coverage received by the KPD in
SPD newspapers. However, while the two party’s representatives
in local parliaments cooperated on some issues, KPD reports to
East Berlin concluded that truly “close cooperation” was a distant
prospect.15
Resolutions and similar publications issued by the KPD’s
local organizations in the western zones in 1947 testified to the
rank-and-file’s readiness to embrace the SED’s instructions to
fight for a unified working class and single socialist party. These
resolutions, adopted by state and local party branches at KPD
meetings, either did not talk about national unity or placed it as
a secondary goal dependent on achieving socialist unity first.16
The KPD at the state level also made public overtures to SPD to
cooperate in state parliaments, although they seldom met with
success. The SPD in Bavaria, for example, rejected one offer to
form an alliance, citing acrimony between the parties on the national level, the KPD’s untrustworthiness, and the fact that the
public overture revealed that the proposal was a cynical attempt
to frame the SPD as a barrier to socialist solidarity. The KPD’s
media also rallied around the cause of socialist unity, while paying little more than lip service to national unity in their articles.
The first edition of Unser Tag, a KPD paper, ran a headline reading “Socialists Unified – Germany Unified” but the following
article focused exclusively on the need for socialists to unite.17
Although not published in the Soviet zone, it nevertheless was a
product of SED proxies in the western zones and aligned neatly
with the general line taken by both the SED and KPD in the late
1940s.
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Messing with Success: Crushing Socialist Unity Throughout
Germany
Beginning in 1948, however, the temporary crystallization around rhetoric prioritizing socialist unity shattered, as
leaders in East Berlin purged social democratic opposition in the
Soviet zone SED and gradually abandoned efforts to orchestrate
a merger of working class parties in the western zones. In the second half of 1948, the Soviets and their proxies in the SED leadership realized that the time was ripe to consolidate their control
of the party and implement Soviet-style democratic centralism,
prohibiting internal factions or dissent from leadership decisions.
Naimark traces this decision to strengthen schooling and purge
membership to growing anti-Soviet sentiment in the Soviet zone,
particularly from former SPD-members, and the Marshall plan’s
economic allure. (Soviet zone communists were surprisingly silent on the Berlin Blockade, even internally, mentioning it only
as an element of western propaganda.)18 By October 1948, leading SED members from the SPD fled the Soviet zone and publicly denounced the project, causing the SED’s communist controllers to establish organs to expel any untrustworthy converts
from the SPD who had not already left. Even as Stalin encouraged German communists to employ guile to avoid alienating
non-communists throughout Germany, he allowed the SED to
abandon any pretension to serve as a vehicle for unity or equality between social democratic and communist groups. By early
1949, full implementation of democratic centralism marked “the
end of the unity party in practice and in theory” as the SED became, in the words of one defector, the “Ulbricht KPD.”19
The Soviet occupation ensured that the Muscovites
emerged triumphant in the debate over the future of leftism in
Germany, as Soviet occupiers ordered their proxies to complete
socialist unification in the Soviet zone and promote it with intensified agitation in the western zones. However, by 1948, both
Soviets and their proxies began to abandon the socialist unity
Penn History Review
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message underpinning these efforts. In the Soviet zone, the SED
became a party explicitly replicating the Soviet Union’s Bolsheviks, and thus had no room for social democrat dissenters. But in
the western zones the SED increasingly lost its allure as a model
for leftist social democrats. With the rhetoric and goals of the
socialist unity project vandalized and abandoned by Soviets and
Muscovites, East German operations to influence politics in the
west would require new goals and language.
Rhetoric in 1949-1951: National Division, National Unity, and
Peace
1949 brought a dramatic change as Germany’s occupation turned into formal division with the establishment of the
Federal Republic of Germany on May 23 and the ratification
of the German Democratic Republic constitution on October
7. Competition between the two semi-sovereign Germanys for
legitimacy, recognition, and survival as the German state began
immediately, and would persist for the next forty years.20 The
establishment of two separate states, neither of which recognized
the other, and each of which asserted its right to be the sole Germany, contributed to a pronounced shift in East Germany’s political agitation in West Germany, as well as some change in the
practices they employed. The content of East German appeals
shifted from a rhetoric of unifying the German working class to
one of unifying the German nation and thereby securing peace.
This tapped into a sense that Germany’s division was unnatural
and a growing fear of war and responded to the slow demise
of the KPD and the establishment of the National Front for a
Democratic Germany (NF). The GDR attempted to expand its
organizational efforts in West Germany by founding National
Front committees and off-shoots of East German mass organizations, deploying instructors, and supporting a decaying KPD.
From home, East Germany also conducted an expanded informational campaign centered around sending literature, organiz78
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ing personal correspondence and mentoring West German visitors.
This section traces the rhetorical shift, which began prior
to the NF’s establishment with a growing interest among East
German leaders in working the national question into their
agitation in western Germany. I then show how this approach
continued to dominate after the National Front’s foundation,
as highlighted by four core tenets: (1) an emphasis on national
unity and peace, (2) a persistent critique of the KPD in West
Germany, (3) a desire to reach all Germans and (4) a description
of allies in West Germany as patriots rather than socialists. In
terms of executing agitation, it suffices to say that the National
Front grew in importance, establishing committees directly in
West Germany to organize supporters there, while also directing
campaigns from within West Germany designed to reshape public opinion in the FRG.
Start of the Shift
In January 1949, the SED created its West Commission,
which coordinated East German agitation in West Germany. Initially, the Commission focused on the same economic questions
and the working-class’ unity that drove political agitation in prior
years. For example, at its first meeting, the body discussed using
radio broadcasts in West Germany to publicize East Germany’s
success in economic reconstruction. This type of economic focus
occasionally recurred in the coming years.21 However, April saw
the first East German attempt to weaponize the national question
in agitation. Although the West Commission did not explicitly
discuss the motivation for focusing on German unity, Germany’s
blatantly deepening division between east and west, whether because of growing hostility between the U.S. and USSR, the Berlin blockade, or the gradual consolidation of the three western
zones, thrust the prospect of the country’s future disunity into
the spotlight. Another important factor may have been that, in
Penn History Review
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the summer of 1949, Stalin recalled Sergei Tiul’panov to Moscow. Tiul’panov had been essential in suppressing the unionists
and driving the Soviet Union’s proxies towards the message of socialist unity that dominated earlier years. His removal may have
opened space for a return to a nationalist rhetoric, which could
have attracted East German leaders for its potential appeal to not
just the working class, but all Germans.
East German leaders expected a message focused on
national unity to resonate with most West Germans, who they
imagined considered a unified Germany to be normal but were
exhausted by the conflict in German life over the past thirty years.
At the time, a forty-year division was unthinkable for both West
and East Germans. Despite their Marxist pedigree, East German
leaders may have been predisposed to this narrative; the attitude
that reunification was a fast-approaching, worthy goal was particularly pronounced in older generations, including those in
charge of East Germany, who had only known a unified German
state. Outside of the GDR, East German intelligence confirmed
West Germans’ faith in reunification. Throughout the first decade of the post-war era, this information came from travel reports filed by any East German functionary or instructor travelling in the FRG, conversations with visitors from West Germany,
and compiled reports titled “Voices from West Germany” that
drew from both public statements and private correspondence.
These tended to confirm East German leaders’ belief that their
compatriots in the West viewed national reunification as a priority, reporting growing West German support for a program
emphasizing national unity and peace even into the 1950s.22
By the end of 1949, the four core tenets of the GDR’s
new approach to political agitation in West Germany had
emerged. First, SED West Commission meeting minutes testify
to the organization’s focus on promulgating narratives of national
unity and peace. Second, in October, a senior SED official in
charge of Westarbeit blasted the KPD for campaigning on unpopular issues such as socialism and the USSR. Third, in pursuit
80
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of a broad audience, the official suggested that the Communists
should seek common ground with bourgeois West German parties, instead of attacking them. Finally, Dahlem emphasized that
West Germany’s national liberation required participation from
not just the working class, but patriots from all classes. To ensure
a consistent agitational message, the West Commission formalized these positions at a meeting with the East German media.23
The West Commission also made these expectations clear to the
KPD, when they issued directions to the KPD leadership in
Frankfurt am Main.24
National Unity and Peace
The National Front (NF) played a central role in driving
the German unity rhetoric. While of marginal importance in the
GDR’s legislative history, considering that the SED dominated
East German domestic politics, a history of East German political agitation in West Germany would be wholly inadequate
without an examination of the NF’s work. By November 1949,
the slowly developing NF offered a new locus and inspiration for
East German efforts to find novel, persuasive ways of winning
over West Germans and motivating them to resist. Formally established in March 1950, but active before then, the NF claimed
to represent all of East Germany’s political parties and mass organizations in the People’s Assembly and presented a unified list to
voters during elections designed to ensure continued dominance
by the communist SED. From the beginning, the NF’s public literature and private meetings emphasized its crucial role in planning, organizing and executing East German efforts to woo and
mobilize West Germans with a message of national unity and
peace.
One of the first platforms issued by the NF offered a
clear example of the new organization’s philosophy and aims in
its work. The NF proclaimed its commitment to a sustainable
peace grounded in German unity, demanding a just peace treaty
Penn History Review
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and the withdrawal of all occupation troops – the sole “path for
winning Germany’s unity and national independence.”25 Overall,
the platform set a number of goals reinforcing the conclusion
that the National Front took its moniker seriously: unification
on a democratic basis, ending the special status of all parts of
Germany (i.e. the Saarland Protectorate and the Ruhr valley);
opposing remilitarization; opposing the return of German industrialists; and defending German culture against the “cultural
barbarianism of the American imperialists.”26 It differentiated the
National Front’s task in West Germany from its overall approach
to the German nation. In the West, the NF sought to “enlighten”
West German citizens about how policies enacted by Adenauer
on behalf of the Western powers would lead to war, “destroy Germany and annihilate the German nation” and then organize the
“peace-loving and patriotic” into a network of circles capable of
undertaking further work.27 The concluding call to arms was ad-

The National Front’s Headquarters in East Germany in 1953
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dressed to all Germans, “regardless of station, gender or profession” and promised that the NF was on the march in and would
soon liberate all of Germany.28
The NF also linked their national unification struggle to
international events that provided ammunition to their agitators, as was the case with the 1950 Prague Declaration. In October 1950, the foreign ministers of the Soviet bloc states met in
Prague and issued a declaration affirming their commitment to
the unification of Germany but voicing concern that West German rearmament would prevent this. The NF leaderships’ reaction to the declaration, which neatly aligned with the combined
message of unity and peace they had developed since the start
of the year, indicated how their rhetoric had matured. At the
start of November, the NF’s central office accepted a proposal
that called for committees in both Germanys to popularize the
Prague declaration and its twin goals of peace and reunification.
In West Germany, NF committees were to redouble their efforts
to educate fellow West Germans through events, gatherings and
the leveraging of members’ personal connections and influence
outside the organization. The leadership also committed to expanding the corps of instructors they had available to deploy to
West Germany. The proposal instructed committees in the GDR
to take over the sending of literature and letters to targets in the
west, particularly leveraging members with significant ties to
or history with Germany’s western half. The plan also assigned
GDR committees the task of engaging visiting individuals and
delegations from the FRG to correct western “lies” and lay the
foundation for future correspondence and cooperation.29 The
nature, extent and trajectory of these practices from 1949 until
1951 are discussed in depth below. Here, it suffices to note that
while none of these practices were new, their combination into
a unified plan designed to advance a single objective was. In the
following years, the NF repeatedly responded to both international reunification initiatives and West German treaty ratifications with plans that sought to channel the full spectrum of their
Penn History Review
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capabilities into shaping West German politics on a single issue.
An emphasis on safeguarding German culture closely followed the shift towards national unity as the organizing principle
of East German Westarbeit. At the NF’s high-level conference in
November 1950, the president of the National Front’s top committee spoke about the translating the motto of unity and peace
into action. To him, this could be achieved by sending more personal-political letters from East Germany, engaging with West
Germans traveling to the GDR, and expanding committees in
West Germany. Crucially, he concluded with an appeal to all
Germans by encouraging them to participate in these activities
as participants in a national liberation movement to defend German culture. Particularly, efforts at all levels and in all dimensions
would do well to portray the GDR as at the forefront of a German “national cultural reinvention” and in stark contrast to West
Germany, which was allegedly sinking ever further in American
“unculture” and cosmopolitanism.30 Indeed, even simple bulletins bound for NF committees in West Germany anticipated
these high-profile pronouncements, noting that the cells should
“show the movement for national unity, independence and peace
in West Germany” and highlight the ways in which the GDR’s
accomplishments furthered German national independence and
cultural revival.31 East Germany’s close affinity with German culture is surprising for a state ostensibly following Marx, who famously claimed that workers had no nation.32 However, roots of
this development may lie in the Soviet Union’s appropriation of
Russian culture and patriotism during the depths of the Second
World War and its strident condemnation of western “cosmopolitanism.”33 An accident of geography further contributed to
this emphasis on German culture. Many towns central to German culture – Jena, Wittenberg, Leipzig – lay within the GDR’s
borders, allowing the state to claim that it guarded the memories
linked to these sites as well.
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Socialism’s Eclipse
Despite billing itself as the guardian of German culture,
there was one living piece of German history that East Germans
in charge of West German agitation were eager to remake – the
KPD. Communism and Marxism had their roots in giants of
nineteenth century German philosophy – Hegel, Feuerbach, and
of course Marx and Engels. The KPD itself had a proud tradition of defying authority and attempting to make revolution –
most famously in 1919 when street revolutions to turn Germany
socialist red instead left stained streets of Berlin and Munich a
bloodier shade of red.
Franz Dahlem first encouraged the KPD to prioritize German unity and German peace over German socialism in October
1949. Nevertheless, the KPD’s inadequate movement towards
the National Front’s line remained a recurrent challenge for those
in the SED and NF charged with managing East German efforts
in the FRG. In March 1950, the SED’s West Commission decided again that the NF’s policy must become the KPD’s general
line at all levels of its work. Particularly, they ordered the KPD to
highlight the dangers of western occupation for the freedom and
material interests of the non-working class in their campaigning
and outreach. In May, members of the SED’s West Commission again lambasted the KPD for performing poorly in recent
elections in North-Rhein Westphalia, losing control of unions,
and failing to adequately engage with dissatisfied SPD members.
While this last point is at first reminiscent of earlier pushes for a
unified socialist party, they proposed rectifying these shortcomings with political instruction on the importance of “the struggle
for peace and German unity.” Statements by Otto Grotewohl,
East Germany’s prime minister, exhorted to Germans to vote for
national unity, rather than socialist unity.34
Emphasizing this prioritization of reunification while
avoiding the question of whether a united Germany would adopt
Penn History Review
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socialism was a deliberate strategy. In January 1951, a NF working conference with representatives from West Germany explicitly noted that all participants in the national struggle should
put aside the question of how Germany would look ten years
after reunification. Instead of dealing with this thorny question,
the West German committee leaders and instructors present were
directed to focus their efforts on building a movement that focused on the uncontroversial goal of pan-German understanding
as the precondition for German reunification. Through the end
of 1951, senior NF leaders continued to argue that national reunification needed to precede any conversation about a united
Germany’s economic future.35
From the outset, the National Front’s Western Division
expressed frustration with the KPD, complaining that the KPD’s
membership was ignorant of the national struggle’s importance
to be an effective tool in the FRG. The exasperation is palpable in
an August 1950 NF report condemning a KPD speech in Hamburg as adequate for a communist crowd, but wholly inappropriate for the broad audience they should be courting.36 Also in
August, the SED’s West Commission issued explicit, actionable
correctives to the KPD to draw parallels between the reunifications struggles of Korea and Germany and organize national resistance.37
These critiques underscore the importance placed on messages
coopting both German unity and peace by the SED and NF.
Yet such attempts to shift the emphasis of GDR agitation in the
west did not go unnoticed or uncontested by KPD members.
One Hamburg comrade, writing in June 1950 to the East German government, protested the NF’s promise to respect private
property and suggested that he might have to break with the
party.38 Such pushback, in combination with the KPD’s persistent narrow concentration on West German communists, may
have driven the NF to explore the feasibility of alternative media
outlets that would appeal to broad swathes of West Germany
from a non-communist angle.
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A Broadly Appealing Message on a Broad Wavelength
As the National Front propelled East German agitational
rhetoric in a nationalistic and pacifistic direction, both it and
the SED also insisted that this message should reach a broad audience of all Germans, regardless of class, in both the east and
the west. This marked a distinct departure from the KPD and
SED’s narrow focus on the working class during the years from
1945 until 1949. The importance of this widened appeal cannot
be understated. It provides insight into both the motivation for
the shift and the logic behind the East Germans’ tactics. East
German leaders likely held a sincere belief that a rhetoric of soft
nationalism and pacifism could win West Germans to the GDR’s
cause.
By the middle of 1950, the National Front’s appraisals of
their own organizational work in West Germany highlighted the
emphasis they placed on creating a broad, national movement to
work for national unity, rather than Germany-wide working-class
socialism. These noted that, although the number of committees
had grown prodigiously, members often confused the NF’s priorities. To rectify this, they recommended reminding members that
the NF’s essence was the national question, and not any other.
Furthermore, these committees still drew heavily on the working
class, which leaders in the NF’s senior East German ranks explicitly named a serious weakness.39 Notably, instructions for the
NF’s West German committees directed them to improve their
outreach to the commercial class, who might be influenced by
promises of renewed trade with East Germany and Eastern Europe. This allegedly brought the NF success in Hamburg, where
one NF committee claimed almost two hundred merchants as
members.40 Some senior officials, reflecting the mentality reinforced by intelligence reports from West Germany, expressed
frustration that this supposedly broad resentment of the United
States, France, and Great Britain had not yet translated into a
rapid expansion of the National Front’s movement. Walter Fisch,
Penn History Review

87

All Quiet on the West German Front?

a member of the SED’s West Commission, blamed this failure
primarily on the National Front’s rank and file, particularly in
West Germany where too much attention had been paid to the
number of committees and not enough to developing the committees’ political lives to influence West German politics on the
national question.41
The focus on building the presence of the National Front
itself and other mass organizations in West Germany was a tacit
recognition of the KPD’s further decline. By August 1950, the
SED and the National Front jointly admitted that the KPD drew
ever fewer votes in elections and won ever fewer seats in parliaments, although this decline was naturally ascribed to repression
and “terrorism” by the Adenauer government. Nevertheless, the
participants at this conference concluded that their work in West
Germany should center around mass organizations, particularly
the National Front, rather than the KPD, now that elections
seemed not to reflect the popular will.42 Simultaneously, during
large conventions in East Germany designed to draw West Germans, they made a deliberate effort to limit the weight of the
KPD in West German representation. For example, at the National Congress in September 1950, they placed explicit caps on
the percentage of West German delegates who should be drawn
from the KPD in an effort to invite and perhaps turn West Germans in groups that were not yet working for East German interests.43 The SED’s senior leaders passed similar instructions to
the mass organizations operating in West Germany, challenging
them to extend their membership to West Germans who were
not already communists or in the working class.44
Allies in West Germany occasionally encouraged East
German agitators to redouble their attempt to craft broad appeals
and movements. An evaluation of pan-German work in June
and July 1951 discussed efforts to pass literature to and engage
in conversation with West Germans at the inter-zone crossing
points. It particularly praised one example in which a “friend”
chided a West German for thinking that they were any different,
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reminding him “that we are Germans and that Germans belong
to Germany.”45 Another report from the middle of 1951 criticized work in the border regions, but featured feedback from a
West German in contact with East Germans who encouraged
them to continue finding language that appeals to all Germans,
rather than just communists or the working class.46 Both cases
offer clear examples and implicit evidence for the kind of rhetoric that the SED and National Front deemed desirable – talk
of Germany targeting all Germans rather than talk of socialism
targeting only the lowest classes.
The insistence on a broad movement capable of reaching all West Germans, regardless of political view or social class,
remained constant through the end of 1951. A NF evaluation
of a year of work in West Germany noted that the organization
needed to insinuate itself in West German movements and coopt them for “the national resistance and the struggle against
remilitarization and for the reunification of our fatherland.” Particularly, NF committees in West Germany were to engage with
a wider circle of West Germans and support any willing to cooperate with the national movement. East German analysts argued
that the supposedly quickening pace of war preparations would
make ever more West Germans receptive to the NF’s message
of unity and peace. To hasten this process, they encouraged all
GDR initiatives in West Germany to denounce Adenauer as a
national traitor and to show how the GDR worked on behalf of
all Germans.47
Supporting a Patriotic Resistance
The way in which East German documents often described their collaborators and supporters further reinforces the
impression that proper national identity supplanted class identity
as a delineating factor between ally and foe. Authors and speakers often referred to those whom they saw as furthering their
interpretation of national unity as “patriots,” rather than “comPenn History Review
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rades.” One proposal for a future National Front office meeting,
for example, suggested offering legal help to “patriots” persecuted by the West German government.48 In fact, this emphasis on
German national patriotism traced back to the National Front’s
earliest days. One of the first public National Front resolutions
for a pan-German audience from February 1950 concluded by
claiming that all who “love their German fatherland,” whether in
the GDR or FRG, had a duty to join the NF’s ranks.49
An uproar in April 1951 over Helgoland’s status provided an ideal opportunity for this East German blend of peace
and unity. Helgoland is a small island off Germany’s North Sea
coast, which the British military retained immediately following
World War II for training purposes, thus making it impossible
for Germans displaced from the island during the war to return.
In early 1951, a band of West German youths illegally sailed to
Helgoland, planted the German flag and a peace banner and
were promptly arrested by authorities. This chain of events provoked a passionate response from East German leaders and the
assets they controlled on both sides of the border in an attempt to
exploit what seemed to be a series of fortunate events. Agitators
cried both for the return of the islands to Germans who had lived
there and against the island’s use in British “war preparations” in
appeals directed at the entire German population. The National
Front’s public resolutions protested that the youths should not
be charged for raising the German tricolor over German soil.
Furthermore, they called for the island’s immediate return to the
German nation and for displaced Germans to return and rebuild
their lives there. This might have been one of the National Front’s
rare successes, as the British government did agree to allow West
German citizens to return to Helgoland and a British Labor MP
wrote to the National Front expressing his satisfaction at the island’s return.50
The passage of time only intensified this portrayal of West
German supporters. Patriotism featured heavily in a November
1950 guideline for committees and agitation groups in both Ger90
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manys. The central National Front committee tasked branches in
both the west and the east with strengthening the “national resistance struggle of German patriots in the west and south of our
homeland.” German “patriots” could do this by organizing unified protest actions and supporting the solidarity movement for
West Germans caught participating in strikes, protests, or other
actions that might require them to pay fees, face legal action, or
forgo wages.51 Patriots could certainly be found in the working
class and the call for strikes suggests that NF leaders expected to
draw significant support from that quarter. However, there was
never any indication that the working class monopolized the love
of the German fatherland. Repeated references to broad movements and expansion beyond the working class reinforce the impression that East German leaders expected patriots to be found
in all sections of West German society.
It is important to recognize that national unity and pacifism were guiding, but not exclusive, frameworks for East German influence operations in West Germany after 1949. In a state
as expansive as the GDR and in organizations as broad as the
National Front and the SED conflicting statements were inevitable. Just as the period from 1945-1949 saw isolated cases of
individuals emphasizing national unity over class unity, the period from 1949-1951 saw instances where officials continued to
favor a rhetoric centered on working-class political unity rather
than on national reunification and peace. Indeed, the KPD, as
we have seen, was particularly obstinate, even in the face of repeated prodding from superiors in East Berlin. In East Germany,
it was the SED that continued to mix messages through the end
of 1950. In July, Otto Grotewohl, a figure closely associated with
the East German SPD’s decision to subsume itself under the
SED, spoke at a SED party conference about the need for the
working class to democratize and unify Germany.52 In November, the SED organized a conference on the “Action Unity of the
Working Class.” There, senior East German politicians offered
speeches which fluidly switched between unity of the nation and
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unity of the working class, while West Germans in attendance
emphasized socialist unity in their controlled comments and
speeches.53 However, these occasional conferences and comments
were marginal compared to the pervasive invocations of peace
and patriotism, national resistance, and national reunification.
Rhetoric in 1952-1955: Narrowing Focus on Treaties and a General Collapse
From 1952 to 1955, East German political agitation applied the same central themes and practices to narrower causes,
but increasingly struggled to make a mark in the face of both
German and global events. During this period, Germany’s de facto division persisted and themes of national unity and peace remained central to East German agitation in West Germany. Diffuse exhortations to expand the national and peace movements
transformed into specific instructions to counter individual West
German initiatives, particularly treaties that more firmly drew
Bonn into the Western orbit. Appraising work in 1951 and looking ahead to 1952, East German planners expressed reserved satisfaction with the state of work in West Germany and believed
that conditions would continue to favor their efforts.54 However,
these ambitions and specific instructions accompanied a series
of events that posed serious challenges to the credibility of East
German messaging and stymied their ability to operate directly
in West Germany. Thus, by 1955, the content of East German
political agitation had lost its confident promises of national reunification, while its execution shifted almost exclusively towards
techniques grounded in East Germany. While the execution of
East Germany agitation is beyond the scope of this paper, during
these years, the scale and organization of letter writing, literature
distribution and visitor mentorship each expanded. In contrast,
activities in West Germany, particularly around the National
Front (NF) and mass organizations, increasingly decayed.
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Continuing the Rhetoric of a Broad, National Campaign
As demonstrated in Chapter IV, the National Front’s establishment accelerated a shift in East German agitation towards
a message emphasizing national unity and directed to a broad
audience. This surprising emphasis on appealing to all Germans,
rather than just the working class traditionally receptive to communism, remained a constant into 1952. The first work plan of
that year outlined a need to rally West Germans, regardless of
religious confession or party membership, in a common struggle
to secure German national sovereignty and to defend German
culture, both of which American troops and weak West German
leadership supposedly threatened.55 Internal planning documents
acknowledged and accepted that East Germany would be unable
to achieve its objectives in the FRG through the West German
working class alone. Public speeches sponsored by the SED in
1952 also explicitly acknowledged this fact and described the NF
as the only tool capable of welding together all forces “rejecting
the politics of division and embracing the politics of unity.” One
particular speech concluded with an appeal to Germans of “all
parties, world views, jobs and social classes” to immerse themselves in the battle for unity and peace that East German leaders
saw themselves as fighting.56 Similarly, descriptions of West German sympathizers as “patriots” saturated even reports criticizing
the overall effort and specific shortcomings, such as an annual
review of East German political agitation in 1954. This report
featured explicit admissions that many West Germans no longer
believed national reunification to be a realistic cause. Yet the
report continued describing West German supporters as patriots
and ordered informational campaigns to further emphasize the
national question.57 The western middle classes and nationalists
targeted by such rhetoric and planning may have been indifferent to such appeals. However, judging by their public statements
and private planning, East German leaders were committed to a
broad, pan-German agitation.
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The most senior East German leaders affirmed the shift
towards nationalism, and NF elites turned to these statements
to legitimize their decision to prioritize nationalist rhetoric over
socialism. During a May 1952 meeting of the NF’s leading council, one speaker quoted Ulbricht as saying, “the central question
is and remains the national question.” Based on this, the speaker
argued that the task before the NF was to lead “Germans of all
world-views, without regard to their party affiliation, to the ranks
of the great national movement.”58 Likewise, in a speech in December 1953, the president of the NF, Erich Correns, noted that
“...our serving minister President Walter Ulbricht ... has drawn
the attention of all Germans to the fact that today it is less about
parties than it was in 1947 – rather, today, more than in 1947,
it is about the entire nation.”59 In these comments, Ulbricht not
only explicitly renounced the overwhelming but narrow focus
of the 1940s on replicating the SED in West Germany, but also

Dr. Erich Correns, President of the National
German Front, in 1961
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condoned the rhetorical turn towards agitation founded on German sovereignty, identity, and independence. Correns’ speech
offered a stellar example of the narrative to which Ulbricht was
referring. Correns listed a standard battery of complaints – Adenauer’s national betrayal and the ruin of West German culture by
American “gangsters” – and proposed now-standard solutions –
protests, efforts to “save German national culture,” and petitions
publicizing Soviet and East German peace and unity proposals.60
The rhetorical priority on reunification and peace was
not the sole preserve of the elite, but continued to bubble up
in the reports percolating from the local- and district-level organizations towards the national archives. One such report, on
East German informational efforts, framed these as necessary to
convince West Germans of the need to “do everything in order
to secure peace and German unity.”61 This statement not only
conformed to the twin themes dominating agitation after 1949,
but also clearly revealed a belief that informational efforts should
produce action. However, the local level was far from uniformly
disciplined around the message that East German leaders desired, particularly in cases involving the West German Communist Party (KPD). A KPD conference in 1952 oscillated between
condemnations of the American cosmopolitanism’s deleterious
effects on German culture and full-throated defenses of Bolshevism, Marx, and Lenin. Similarly, the KPD’s own report to
East Berlin on their work to advance the “broad patriotic protest
movement” focused on unions and other entities traditionally
part of the left.62
Attempted Ban of the KPD
Although East German leaders sharply criticized the
KPD for its failure to embrace the nationalist-pacifist rhetorical line, they did defend it from external efforts to eliminate the
party. In 1952, when West German authorities threatened to ban
the KPD on the grounds that its activities and message were unPenn History Review
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constitutional, East German leaders and their operation rallied to
the beleaguered party’s defense. The KPD avoided prohibition in
1952 (although it met this fate in 1956), but this episode marked
the first major challenge for East German political agitation in
West Germany and the start of a gradual retreat from the FRG.
Although structural limitations prevented this study
from encompassing West German reactions to East German agitation, Bonn’s attempt to ban the KPD offers some insight into
West German awareness of East German efforts. The charges laid
against the KPD described it as part of East German political
activity designed to further German reunification. The Adenauer
government not only understood the national question’s significance in East German agitation, it also knew that the KPD was
not the sole vehicle for East German influence in the Bonn Republic. A crucial passage noted that there existed in the FRG
“a network of associations, which are either part of the GDR’s
‘mass organizations’ or of ‘pan-German character’ that the NF
influenced, even when they [the organizations] were organized
in West Germany.” The indictment identified almost 40 West
German organizations considered to be proxies for the East German government, whether wittingly or otherwise.63 West German authorities clearly aimed to stifle East Germany’s influence
operations and recognized the NF’s role in these activities.
As the FRG connected the SED and NF in East Germany to a stunning array of organizations and groups in West
Germany, East German leaders scrambled to deny the charges against the KPD. They unsurprisingly concluded that this
was a U.S.-driven effort to deepen German divisions, advance
American interests, and prepare for war. In their response to the
charges, East Germans claimed that a ban would contravene the
will of the burgeoning national reunification movement in both
Germanys.64 Unsigned letters, ostensibly by West Germans, but
edited by Ulbricht’s East Berlin office, defended the KPD on national grounds and charged West German leadership with national treason for their supposed subservience to the U.S.65
96

Cornell Overfield

All Quiet on the West German Front?

While East Germany’s leaders publicly presented the
KPD as an indispensable party in the struggle for reunification,
private communications revealed grave misgivings about the
KPD’s actual commitment to the national project. Reports submitted to Walter Ulbricht’s office at the time sharply criticized
the KPD’s poor activity and organization at the local level and its
reluctance to make any effort at finding common ground with
the bourgeois parties through the national question.66 While internal assessments did not clearly state the indictment’s direct effects on the KPD and NF in West Germany, reports had already
discussed both organizations’ fraying networks and a high-profile
charge would have accelerated this unravelling.
Narrowing Specificity on Treaties
While nationalist appeals between 1949 and 1951 had
diffuse goals of shaping West German opinion and expanding
the national movement, the following years brought this rhetoric to bear on a series of concrete causes – preventing West
German from agreeing to treaties with the West. East German
leaders devoted significant energy to these efforts because they
entailed diplomatic recognition of the FRG, entrenched West
Germany in the capitalist camp, and paved the way for West
German remilitarization, which could threaten the “correlation
of forces” between the communist and capitalist blocs. As early as
1951, East German planners framed West German participation
in western treaties as initiatives that their operations in both parts
of Germany should oppose.67 However, East German organizational and informational operations only focused upon opposing
treaties beginning in 1953. Despite East Germany concentrating
their national-patriotic and pacifistic agitation on these treaties,
West Germany proceeded to sign and ratify the Bonn-Paris conventions (also known as the Generalvertrag, signed May 1952,
revised October 1954, implemented May 1955) and European
Defense Treaty (ratified in Germany in 1953, but torpedoed by
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France in 1954).
The Bonn-Paris treaty signed in May 1952 offered the
first test case regarding the possibility of disrupting a treaty’s ratification through parliamentary and extra-parliamentary opposition. In November 1952, the presiding member of the NF’s assembly, Dr. Erich Correns, urged Germans in both East and West
to agitate against the Bonn-Paris treaty and to remind members
of the Bundestag, the West German parliament, of their duty to
reject it. These treaties, he noted, could “only bring about the
unhappiness and annihilation of our nation.”68 This appeal was
premeditated. Two days prior to the speech, Dr. Correns had explained at a planning meeting that the NF must “intensify political activity” in order to prevent the Bonn-Paris Treaty’s ratification in the FRG. Furthermore, he expected both the NF at large
and the KPD’s representatives in the Bundestag to explain how
opposing the treaty would contribute to strengthening national
resistance and furthering national reunification.69 Thus, the NF
and SED’s leaders preserved the broad, pan-German, class-transcending appeals that they had developed in the previous two
years and turned them towards treaties relevant to the German
question’s resolution.
The NF, attempting to influence the Bundestag, compiled
lists of members across parties who had either voiced opposition
to any of the treaties under consideration, or at the very least
demonstrated no overt hostility to the GDR or KPD. These lists
were sometimes forwarded to correspondence circles, suggesting
that they were primarily destined for the local levels, where they
would be used to inundate the representatives with letters from
the GDR. The lists included parliamentarians from all the major
West German parties (the Free Democrats, Christian Democrats,
and Social Democrats), attesting to the NF’s determination to
appeal broadly to Germans, both in the general population and
in West German parliaments.70 Beginning in January 1953, planners in the NF division responsible for coordinating agitation in
and towards West German called on committees to send letters
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and literature directly to Bundestag members – including those
listed in these compendiums.71
Other documents included directions for correspondence circles on rebutting the SPD’s “conservative” arguments
in support of the European Defense Treaty. These offered specific
arguments about Adenauer and the SPD leadership – namely
that neither cared about “the fate of the German nation” – for
East German writers to replicate. For material, they provided
quotes from Adenauer that portrayed him as a willing American
puppet and noted that the debate over a Western European collective security apparatus carried existential implications for the
German nation. War between the blocs would annihilate Germany – intertwining the goals of national unity, national survival
and global peace. Such directions offered clear evidence that East
Germany did not sacrifice broad appeals amidst the pivot towards opposing West German treaties. In fact, these directions
explicitly described as imperative the need to mobilize the entire
GDR population, not just workers, to write letters that could
produce a unified national movement. To those writing this report and others, letters would not contribute to socialism’s spread
but would instead reunify a divided Germany through German
efforts alone.72
Even as assets in West Germany deteriorated in 1954 and
1955, East German leaders continued to bring their agitation
to bear against Western treaty initiatives. In December 1954,
the NF’s National Council issued a statement framing the Paris
Treaty as a step towards war and away from fostering understanding between Germans split by the intra-German border, thereby
staying true to their two cardinal themes. After describing resisting the “Paris War-Pact” as the “great national task of all German people,” the declaration concluded by noting that German
patriots across both Germanys could themselves secure a peaceful
reunification. The working class received a passing mention in
the closing lines. But this declaration, intended in large part for
West German consumption, held aloft the prospect of national
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reunification, rather than a worker’s paradise, as cause for rejecting the Bonn-Paris treaty.73
A 1955 report surveying the NF’s agitation during 1954
testified to the transition from a diffuse attempt to develop a
national movement in West Germany to more focused efforts
against the ratification of individual treaties opposed by the
Communist bloc. This report’s sweeping overview repeatedly
and explicitly linked various aspects of their work to their efforts
to oppose the entrenchment of the treaty system through the
European Defense Treaty and other “war” treaties. It described
these letters, conversations and pamphlets as contributing to understanding between East and West Germans, thereby advancing peace and unity, and trumpeted all new connections between
East and West Germany as the key to unlocking German unity.
While there is brief mention of West German committees, the
sole example of actual work involved farmers in Rhineland-Palatinate, suggesting that the organization in West Germany, while
not dead, had certainly wilted.
That simple example, however, does offer insights into
the NF’s simultaneous desperation and flexibility as they still
endeavored to mount a final counterattack against the looming
implementation of the Bonn-Paris treaty in early 1955. While
East German-backed formal organizations in West Germany certainly shriveled during this focused shift towards treaties, officials
in the NF’s central administration leaped on ad hoc opportunities to link their systematic treaty-opposition campaign to local
grievances in West Germany. In late 1954, a coalition of West
German farmers contacted the East German organization due to
grievances over the effect American military installations had on
their livelihoods. Those in the office responsible for work in West
Germany thought they recognized the situation's potential, and,
in January 1955, issued instructions to East German farmers affiliated with the NF to exchange letters with their West German
peers and ascribe their suffering to the Paris Treaty’s provisions.74
Nevertheless, the absence of any instructions for NF cells in the
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FRG to contact or work with the West German farmers is striking. By early 1955, the East Germans in charge of implementing the influence campaign were reduced to relying on one-off
events. At this point, East German efforts to shape West German
politics retained ambitious goals but were completely dependent
on informational efforts from East Germany to achieve them.
Sustaining a National Anti-Treaty Message in 1954 and 1955
In 1954 and 1955, East German focused its political
agitation on condemning West German treaties by emphasizing
national unity and peace, while adjusting to increasingly limited possibilities to act within West Germany. In May 1954, NF
leadership meetings addressed East German efforts to influence
West German politics. On May 10, the conversation centered
on youth protests in West Germany, yielding admissions from
both NF and Free German Youth (FDJ) leaders that they lacked
any real influence with the promising youth groups. During that
meeting, Dr. Erich Correns, the NF’s president, first explained
that a forthcoming East German appeal should feature “a picture
of Germany appealing to all patriots.” Four days later, another senior leader in the East German Westarbeit clarified to colleagues
that the forthcoming manifesto should strictly avoid socialist language, as it was designed to appeal to West Germans who agreed
with the East German “...opposition to the European Defense
Treaty, but [were] not yet all on the territory of democracy.”75
Yet again, leaders in the NF deliberately tailored their message
toward the national and militarization issues they imagined were
dear to West Germans and consciously sought to avoid conjuring
the specter of socialism.
Those coordinating agitation remained so committed
to a rhetoric prioritizing national reunification and peace that
they were willing to condone attacks on communism itself. At
a NF conference in May 1955, Correns singled out a protest on
January 29 in Frankfurt am Main for praise and as evidence of
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a West German impulse towards unity, democracy, and peace.
This protest group met in Frankfurt’s Paul’s Church, where early
German nationalists made an abortive bid for German unification in 1848. Like those early national heroes, this protest did
convene under a program promoting German unity. However,
protesters also convened under banners decrying communism.76
Despite this hostility toward communism, Correns argued that
this gathering, like its 1848 predecessor, should be lauded as a
step towards a single German state. In earlier years, the NF had
condemned the Neuheimer Kreis for unacceptable positions on
German neutrality and compiled lists of targetable Bundestag
members based in part on whether they attacked the leftist movement. That, in 1955, an openly anti-communist movement received unqualified praise from the NF’s president was astounding
and signaled how dramatically East Germany’s networks in the
FRG had collapsed.
Even as their strength in West Germany withered, those
in charge of East German agitation retained aspirations to operate freely in West Germany, believing that their efforts had borne
some fruit. In the same speech, Correns credited the NF’s informational work for holding up the West German army’s establishment and reinforcing patriots.77 The public appeal published at the conference’s end clearly aspired to galvanize broad
support against the Bonn-Paris both on national and personal
grounds. To entice businessmen and the middle class to join the
national resistance movement, the appeal promised trade with
Eastern Europe. At the same time, the declaration asserted that
the Bonn-Paris Treaty’s repudiation was a precondition for Germany to “enjoy once again national unity and sovereignty.”78 The
SED still explored opportunities to exploit West German agents
when they had the chance, as they did in the summer of 1955
in North-Rhine Westphalia. In this case, a SPD party member
contacted the SED, offering to provide addresses and deliver agitational literature in West Germany. Notably, he did not offer to
join his local NF chapter, but seems to have offered his services
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directly to the SED in East Germany.79 Similarly, East German
planners still compiled detailed lists of SPD functionaries for
each West German state, including their roles, history of contact
with the GDR, and comments such as “ready to help” and “ready
to be contacted.”80
Yet, by the end of 1955, the operation stagnated. A report
about future preparations for pan-German work simply called
on members to develop the same techniques more energetically
and with greater participation from mass organizations. Reports
raised the same issues —incomplete information, lackluster engagement, and incorrect positions on the national question— and
gave the same prescriptions without any effort to explore new approaches or rhetoric. A “Program Clarification” pamphlet issued
in November featured fiery language, including charges that the
Bonn Government employed political subversion in the GDR.
A few pages were dedicated to discussing the NF’s pan-German
task connecting East and West Germans, but much of the pamphlet simply encouraged East Germans to dedicate themselves to
East German development, on the logic that every small victory
for the GDR was a step towards reunification.81 What little support still existed within West Germany was also rapidly evaporating. One report in Ulbricht’s files, compiled from West German
contacts in November 1955, noted that many in the previously
sympathetic leftist SPD faction now claimed that the USSR and
GDR contributed to global tensions as much as the “imperialistic” U.S. and FRG. Other SPD members doubted that Germans
alone could achieve reunification, believing instead that the matter lay in the hands of the four powers.82
Late 1955 and Looking Ahead
How did the content of East German agitation develop
after 1955? Although this question lies outside the scope set in
this thesis, it seems likely that national unity increasingly lost its
allure for both West German targets and East German agitators.
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Both global developments—most importantly the four-power
conference’s failure in 1954 and the success of Adenauer’s trip
to Moscow in September 1955—and popular rejection of the
GDR amid fading hopes for reunification could have driven this
process. In any case, by the end of 1955, East German leaders
downgraded their ambitions, dropping their confident assertions
that immediate reunification was near and admitting publicly
that this goal lay beyond their powers.
By September, the NF’s programs shifted from talk of
national reunification to national détente. Several speakers at the
NF’s September assembly repeatedly announced that the organization’s task now was to work towards national détente across all
social classes, an assignment facilitated by Adenauer’s landmark
trip to Moscow in the summer of 1955. The public call published after the conference framed reunification as a governmentlevel task and détente as a job for the masses. This re-calibration
of East German agitation was an attempt to accommodate the
difficult fact that East Germany’s sponsors in Moscow had now
recognized the FRG. Indeed, speakers baselessly credited NF agitation for Adenauer’s surprising moves in Moscow, claiming that
pressure from anti-war forces at home forced him to accept an
agreement in the Kremlin. Speakers singled out the Paris Treaty
and NATO as targets for “patriots,” but this convention hinted
at the start of a new shift in East German rhetoric.83
In early December, a statement of principle issued by
the NF’s division overseeing agitation reinforced the appearance
of new content in East German messaging. On the heels of the
1955 four-power meeting in Geneva, the document explicitly
admitted that German reunification was no longer attainable
simply through pan-German understanding and resistance to
Adenauer, and instead required significant changes in global politics. The authors, who clearly recognized that reunification could
no longer serve its rhetorical purpose, did not revert to appeals
rooted in unadulterated socialism. They continued to describe
Adenauer as a traitor and encouraged all Germans to take action
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promoting cross-border understanding in expectation of the day
of reunification.84 The 1956 New Year’s Appeal published by the
NF offered similarly muted ambitions. In this case, the majority of the statement instructed East Germans to help reconstruct
their part of Germany. They were also encouraged to build ties
with West Germans to spread GDR propaganda and agitate for
an end to the Cold War and Germany’s division. In a key difference, however, instead of promising reunification as possible in
1956, the declaration settled for a lesser aim of “taking a large
step” toward achieving a unified German homeland.85
By the end of 1955, East German leaders clearly tempered the content of their agitational appeals, not in response to
the suggested KPD ban or to the 1953 uprising, but to the challenges presented by the USSR’s recognition of the FRG and to
the fading possibility of reunification in 1955. This followed both
a narrowing application of East German agitation against West
German treaty ratification on national reunification grounds and
that effort’s utter failure. Emphasizing peace in rhetoric and action in West Germany may have been the future direction of East
German agitation, particularly considering the close relationship
between peace movements and Soviet bloc intelligence agencies
during the Cold War. That question lies outside the scope of this
project. As we have seen here, however, until at least the end of
1955, East German leaders stubbornly stood by rhetorical appeals emphasizing nation and peace over class and Marx.
Conclusion
From 1945 until 1955, East German influence operations in West Germany evolved dramatically, both on the level of
rhetoric and action, reflecting the communist and German characters of East German communists. East German leaders and
agitators began their efforts to influence the western zones with
drives to unify the left on the model of the Soviet zone’s SED,
until the crushing of the SED’s social democrat wing at home left
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this message unusable. After 1949 and Germany’s formal division, national unity and peace remained the twin guiding principles of East German rhetoric, with the early 1950s bringing a
narrower focus in deploying this rhetoric to undermine treaty
initiatives in West Germany. Novel developments and persistent
shortcomings characterized the vehicles by which the East Germans brought their rhetoric to bear. The National Front offered
opportunities to organize supporters directly within West Germany and somewhat skirt the KPD’s toxic brand. Correspondence circles represented a bold attempt to mobilize the East
German masses and shape West German minds. Each period,
however, also struggled with lasting issues of organization, mobilization, and resources, and developing ones, such as the withering of East German organizations in the FRG after 1952. East
Germany’s operations also draws out broader insights about the
role of agency, ideological flexibility and geopolitical restraints in
political warfare.
The trajectory of the GDR’s rhetoric supports the conclusion that geopolitics plays a decisive role in determining
what influence campaigns say and whether they work. Writing
on Iraqi influence campaigns, Samuel Helfont has noted that
although Saddam Hussein’s regime employed “political operations” in the 1980s, they only gained relevance after 1991, when
Iraq could more plausibly claim to be a revolutionary regime taking on the U.S.-led world.86 In East Germany’s case, geopolitical
shifts did not bolster the country’s influence operations so much
as force their leaders to explore new narratives. The events of
1949 and 1950 spurred the shift toward appeals grounded in national unity and peace. Germany’s formal division into two states
made reunification a relevant goal, while war in a divided Korea
and nuclear proliferation gave peace a new urgency. Likewise,
promises of national reunification lost their credibility because of
key diplomatic events in 1954 and 1955. The final four-power
conference in Geneva and Adenauer’s mission to Moscow both
dashed what meager hope remained for a unified Germany and
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may have precipitated a new direction in East German agitation.
The role of geopolitical events and conditions, which can
be beyond the control of a state conducting agitation abroad,
makes flexibility an indispensable virtue for those seeking to conduct influence operations. The narratives that resonate with a
target audience might not align neatly with the ideologies of the
states or leaders implementing these operations. East German
agitators demonstrated flexibility when they abruptly embraced
national rhetoric in 1949 in response to Germany’s division, despite having suppressed East German unionists the year before.
Throughout this period, however, throughout the period, East
German agents compromised on the tactical level —employing
nationalist rhetoric, cooperating with non-communist groups,
and praising anti-communist nationalists— in pursuit of aims
on the strategic level —spreading the SED westwards, undermining the West German government, and hindering western
treaties. The East German case underscores that even notoriously
ideologically actors can recognize the utility of abandoning or
adapting ideological principles to win over foreign audiences.
Although East Germans needed flexibility in the face of
global events that they were often powerless to affect, East German political agitation in West Germany highlights their agency.
The Soviet Union played a critical role in the story of East German agitation in West Germany during the immediate postwar years, but its role after 1949 is far less clear cut. From 1949
onward, the private meetings of the SED and NF’s committees
planning work in West Germany featured neither Soviet representatives nor direct orders from Moscow. East Germans themselves drove the transition towards the rhetoric of reunification
and peace, and the lack of explicit criticism from the Soviets or
their proxies implies that neither group opposed this innovation.
Indeed, recognizing the agency of East Germans and the
tacit Soviet acknowledgement of East Germany’s adapted agitational rhetoric sheds light on previously confusing episodes of
Soviet history. For example, following Stalin’s death in 1953, the
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Soviet Union proposed a reform that included passages stressing reunification, peace infrastructure, and broad appeals to the
people of East and West Germany. Hope Harrison notes that
this emphasis has confused scholars, but my research has demonstrated that references to national unity, peace, and broad mobilization in both Germanys were well-worn elements of GDR
agitation.87 Just as Harrison’s groundbreaking work highlighted
Ulbricht’s critical role in lobbying his Soviet superiors for the Berlin Wall, this research suggest that the Soviet Union’s approach to
the German question at a critical juncture of Cold War history
reflected a position pioneered by East German leaders and party
members.
Still, however much East German influence operations
exemplified agency and flexibility in the face of geopolitical
changes beyond their control, their success in adaptation cannot
mask their ultimate failure. East German agitation inflicted no
casualties among the treaties it opposed, the Adenauer government survived into the 1960s, and Germany remained divided
for over forty years. What explains this persistent failure to fully
exploit the opportunities presented by the leftist groundswell of
the immediate post-war years and Germany’s division? Although
measuring impact lies beyond the strict scope of this thesis, planners remained consistently unhappy with the overall East German
influence operation. More fundamentally, East Germany’s rulers
could not avoid association with the reviled Soviet occupation
and compounded their poor reputation with political repression
and economic stagnation. In a struggle for the hearts and minds
of a foreign country, repellent regimes can render offensive influence operations impotent as quickly as weak messaging or sloppy
execution can.
The Soviet bloc’s collapse thirty years ago drew back the
Iron Curtain, but the recent revival of influence operations as a
danger to democracy has resurrected both fears of Russia’s threat
to the West and the language of the Cold War. While the Cold
War has shaped the development of international relations the108
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ory and remains a popular vantage point for assessing contemporary policy challenges, applying that conflict wholesale to the
present would be a mistake. Examining particular cases, such as
that of East German agitation, however, can shed light on how
core elements of international relations have both changed and
endured. Despite echoes of the Cold War, the actors and actions
have changed —a weakened Russia stands in for a strident Soviet
Union, and Twitter bot networks have replaced mass letter-writing campaigns. Playing to nationalist fears of decline is a tempting but superficial parallel, masking Germany’s unique situation
after 1945. At a time when Russian President Vladimir Putin
can be too readily credited with deciding everything within and
beyond Russia’s borders, this study’s most striking lesson is the
importance of locating where agency is exercised in influence operations. The Soviet Union tasked East Germans with political
operations, but East Germans themselves crafted narratives that
spread to both West Germany and Moscow. Today, greater attention should be paid not to Russia’s leader, but instead to the
radical European politicians courted by Russia. Ultimately, they
determine the narratives and sow the chaos that have caused such
alarm in recent years and may do so in ways unanticipated by
Putin. Researchers studying modern influence operations today
ought to ask whether the dog wags the tail, or the tail wags the
dog.

Penn History Review

109

All Quiet on the West German Front?
Notes
Hubertus Knabe, West-Arbeit Des MfS: Das Zusammenspiel von “Aufklärung”
und “Abwehr” (Berlin: Christoph Links Verlag, 1999); Hubertus Knabe, Die
Unterwanderte Republik: Stasi Im Westen (Propylaeen, 1999) Michael Lemke,
Einheit Oder Sozialismus? Die Deutschlandpolitik Der SED 1949-1961 (Koeln:
Boehlau Verlag, 2001).
2
E.J. Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 148; Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism (London: Verso, 2006).
3
Richard Overy, Why the Allies Won (New York: W.W. Norton & Company,
1995), 291–92.
4
Stefan-Ludwig Hoffmann and Helmut Smith, “Germany Is No More: Defeat Occupation and the Postwar Order,” in The Oxford Handbook of Modern
German History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011).
5
Naimark, The Russians in Germany: A History of the Soviet Zone of Occupation,
1945-49, 258.
6
Naimark, 252–69.
7
For a full account of the Soviet Union’s initial attitude towards socialist unity,
German reactions, and the development of the SED, see Naimark, The Russians in Germany, 271-284.
8
Naimark, The Russians in Germany: A History of the Soviet Zone of Occupation,
1945-49, 284; Naimark, 302–3.
9
Naimark, The Russians in Germany: A History of the Soviet Zone of Occupation,
1945-49, 299–301.
10
NY 4182 863, “Von Ulbricht zu Gen. Meier,” 12.4.1947. All primary
source dates are in day, month, year order.
11
Ibid.
12
NY 4182 863, “Werktätig in Stadt und Land!” 20.4.1947.
13
DY 30 87348, “Die Entwicklung des Kampfes um die SED im Westen,”
1.7.1947.
14
NY 4182 865, “Besprechung des Genossen Ulbricht mit den Genossen Max
Reimann, Kurt Mueller, Walter Fisch,” 1.7.48.
15
NY 4182 863, “Richtlinien zur Arbeit der KPD in der britischen Zone,”
2.1.1947; NY 4182 863, “Zu den Landtagswahlen am 20. April in der Britischen Zone – Die Stellung der Parteien in der Zone,” 21.3.1947; NY 4182 863,
“Bericht über die Unterstützung der Wahlkampagne in der Britischen Zone
durch das Zentralsekretariat der SED,” 23.4.47.
16
NY 4182 863, “Resolution angenommen auf dem Bezirksparteitag am 8.
und 9. February 1947 in Wanne-Eickel”; NY 4182 864 “Sozialisten Vereint
1

110

Cornell Overfield

All Quiet on the West German Front?
- Deutschland Vereint: Manifest des Landesparteitages der KPD Niedersachsen” 1947.
17
NY 4182 864, “Unser Tag, Beilage Nr. 1,” 27.7.1947.
18
Naimark, The Russians in Germany: A History of the Soviet Zone of Occupation, 1945-49, 306.
19
Naimark, The Russians in Germany: A History of the Soviet Zone of Occupation, 1945-49, 311-313.
20
See Glenn Gray, Germany’s Cold War: The Global Campaign to Isolate East
Germany, 1949-1969 for a treatment of this dynamic.
21
DY 30 14733, “Protokoll,” 16.3.1949; DY 30 14733, “Protokoll Nr. 19,”
13.10.1949.
22
DY 6 2172, “Bericht über die Aussprache mit einem Gast aus Westdeutschland,” 4.1.1951; DY 6 2057, “Stimmen aus Westdeutschland” 18.1.1951 –
Even those FRG sources lamenting an apolitical population report that West
Germans increasingly trade “culture-decomposing jazz” for consciousness of
the national question.
23
DY 30 14733, “Protokoll zur Sitzung am 6.10.49,” 6.10.1949.
24
DY 30 14733, “Protokoll Nr. 23,” 11.11.49.
25
DY 6 128, “Programm der Nationalen Front des demokratischen Deutschland,” February 1950, p. 1.
26
Ibid., p. 4-5.
27
DY 6 128, “Programm der Nationalen Front des demokratischen Deutschland,“ February 1950, p. 2-3.
28
Ibid., p. 10.
29
DY 6 2170, “Vorschläge des Büros des Präsidiums des Nationalrats zur
Popularisierung der Erklärung der Aussenminister in Prag,” 2.11.1950.
30
DY 6 130, “Stenographische Niederschrift der 6. Tagung des Nationalrats
der Nationalen Front,” 14.11.1950, p. 75-83.
31
DY 6 2901, “Vermerk: Betr.: Bulletin für Westdeutschland,”14.4.1950.
32
Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, “Manifesto of the Communist Party,” in
The Marx-Engels Reader, ed. Robert C. Tucker (New York: W.W. Norton &
Company, 1978), 488.
33
Valerie A. Kivelson and Ronald Grigor Suny, Russia’s Empires (New York:
Oxford University Press, 2017), 309–17.
34
DY 6 130, “Entschliessung zu den Aufgaben der Ausschüsse und
Aufklärungsgruppen...,” 14.11.1950.
35
DY 6 2171, “Betr. Konferenz am 7.1.1951,” 7.1.1951; DY 6 2168, „Besprechung über gesamtdeutsche Aufgaben beim Büro des Präsidiusm des Nationalrates der Nationalen Front,” 27.10.1951.
36
DY 6 2170, “Bericht über die Besprechung in Hamburg am 12. Und 13.
August 1950,” 15.8.1950.

Penn History Review

111

All Quiet on the West German Front?
DY6 2172, “Lagebericht über die Entwicklung der Nationalen Front in
Westdeutschland,” 7.5.1950; DY 30 14734, “Protokoll Nr. 37,” 16.3.1950;
DY30 14734, “Protkoll Nr. 44,” n.d.; DY 30 14734, “Protokoll Nr. 62,”
2.8.1950; DY 6 2170, “Bericht über die Besprechung in Hamburg am 12.
Und 13. August 1950,” 15.8.1950.
38
DY 6 2170, “An den Volksrat der DDR,” 29.6.50.
39
DY 6 2901, “Übersicht über die Entwicklung der Bewegung der Nationalen
Front des demokratischen Deutschland in Westdeutschland,” 1.6.1950.
40
DY 6 2901 “Arbeitsplan für September und Oktober 1950”
41
DY 30 14734, “W. Fisch über den Stand der Bewegung der Nationalen
Front in Westdeutschland,” 27.6.1950.
42
DY 6 2170, “Sitzung der Westkommission das ZK der SED mit Vertretern
der Massenorganisationen und des Nationalrats,” 4.8.1950.
43
DY 30 14733, “Einschätzung der Delegation zum III. Deutschen Volkskongreß.” 1.6.1949; DY 6 2901, “Schlüssel für die Benennung der Mitglieder
für den westdeutschen Arbeitausschuss,” (15.8.1950); DY 6 2901, “Vorbereitung des Nationalkongressess,” 5.8.1950.
44
DY 6 2170, “Sitzung der Westkommission das ZK der SED mit Vertretern
der Massenorganisationen und des Nationalrats,” 4.8.1950
45
DY 6 2173, „Bericht über gesamtdeutsche Arbeit in den Monaten Juni und
Juli,” 6.8.1951.
46
DY 6 2170, “Unterstützung des nationalen Widerstandkampfes in Westdeutschland und Westberlin,” 1951.
47
DY 6 2172, “Bericht über die gesamtdeutsche Arbeit im Büro des Präsidiums des Nationalrats in der Zeit vom November 1950 bis zum September
1951,” n.d.,1951, p. 28.
48
DY 6 2901, “Vorlage für die nächste Bürositzung,” 2.11.1950.
49
DY 6 128, “Beschluss über die Konstitutierung des Nationalrates,” 3.2.1950.
50
DY 6 2167, “Protestentschliessung des Nationalrates gegen den rechtswidrigen Status von Helgoland...,“ n.d. 1951; DY 6 2167, “Abschrift: Nationale
Front unterstützt Helgoland-Aktion,” 4.4.1951; DY 6 2167 contains further
material on the NF’s response to this episode.
51
DY 6 130 “Entschliessung zu den Aufgaben der Ausschüsse und Aufklärungsgruppen...“ 14.11.1950
52
DY 30 40015, “Steographische Niederschrift des III. Parteitages der Sozialistichen Einheitspartei Deutschlands vom 20.-24. Juli 1950.”
53
DY 30 20566, “Stenographisches Protokoll der Aussprache über die Aktionseinheit der Arbeiterklasse, Grünau,” 25.11.1950, p. 26, 30-50.
54
DY 6 2168, “Arbeitsplan für die Monate Januar und Februar 1952,”
4.1.1952.
55
DY 6 2168, “Arbeitsplan für die Monate Januar und Februar 1952,”
37

112

Cornell Overfield

All Quiet on the West German Front?
4.1.1952.
56
DY 30 20543, “Ausschuss demokratische Rechte Bund der Deutschen.”
n.d..
57
DY 6 2163, “Jahresbericht 1954 der Abteilung Gesamtdeutsche Arbeit,“
7.4.1955.
58
DY 6 183, “Sitzung des Praesidiums des Nationalrates der Nationalen Front
des demokratischen Deutschland,” 22.5.1952.
59
DY 6 184, “Steograpfische Niederschrift des Präsidiums des Nationalrats
der Nationalen Front des demokratischen Deutschland,” 7.12.1953, 3-4.
60
Ibid, 12-14.
61
DY 6 2172, “Aus unserem Situationsbericht Nr. 19 vom 1. Dezember
1951,” 16.2.1952.
62
NY 4182 871, “Die Entwicklung einer breiten patriotischen Protestbewegung gegen Schumanplan und Wehrgesetz,” 7.3.1952; “Die Ergebnisse des
ersten Parteilehrjahres...,” n.d. 1952.
63
NY 4182 869, “Antwort der KPD auf den Verbotsantrag der Bundesregierung“ n.d. 1952 p. 69-75.
64
NY 4182 869, “Anlage Nr. 4 to Protokoll Nr. 129 vom 4. Januar 1952 Weitere Massnahmen zur Verstärkung der Kampagne gegen die Verbotsabsichten gegen die KPD”.
65
NY 4182 869, “An den Herrn Vorsitzenden des 1. Senats des Bundsverfassungsgerichts,” n.d., 1952; NY 4182 869, “An das Bundesverfassungsgericht
in Karlsruhe,” n.d., 1952.
66
NY 4182 869, “Anlage Nr. 4 to Protokoll Nr. 129 vom 4. Januar 1952 Weitere Massnahmen zur Verstärkung der Kampagne gegen die Verbotsabsichten gegen die KPD.”
67
DY 6 2171, “Arbeitsplan der Abteilung IV für die Monate Oktober/November 1951,” 4.10.1951.
DY 6 2171, “an Berliner Ausschuss”, “Betr. Arbeit der Ausschüsse der Nationalen Front des demokratischen Deutschlands in Westberlin,” 5.9.1951;
DY 6 2170, “Bericht über die gesamtdeutsche Arbeit im Lande Sachsen,”
15.10.1951.
68
DY 6 132, “Tagungen des Nationalrates der Nationalen Front des demokratischen Deutschland,” 12.11.1952.
69
DY 6 183, “Der Sitzung des Praesidiums des Nationalrates der Nationalen
Front des demokratischen Deutschland,” 10.11.52 p. 1-4.
70
DY 6 2168, “Aufstellung von Bundestagsabgeordneten,” n.d. 1953; “Zweite
Liste von Bundestagsabgeordneten für die Arbeit der Korrespondenzzirkel,”
n.d. 1953.
71
DY 6 2168, “Arbeitsplan für Monat Februar 1953,” 30.1.1953.
72
DY 6 2168, “Argumentationsmaterial für die Korrespondenzzirkel,” n.d.,

Penn History Review

113

All Quiet on the West German Front?
1953, 3, 11.
73
DY 6 189, “Erklärung des Präsidiums des Nationalrates der Nationalen
Front des demokratischen Deutschland,“ 6.12.1954.
74
DY 6 2163, “Betrifft: Unterstützung der Bauern von Rheinland/Pflaz im
Widerstand gegen Landbeschlagnahmen,” 13.1.1955.
75
DY 6 185, “Stenographische Niederschrift Präsidiumssitung des Nationalrates der Nationalen Front des demokratischen Deutschland,” 10.5.1954,
13-15; DY 6 185, “Stenografisches Protokoll der Sitzung des Praesidiums des
Nationalrats der Nationalen Front des demokratischen Deutschland am 14.
Mai 1954.”
76
DY 6 134, “Tagung des Nationalrats der Nationalen Front des Demokratischen Deutschland,“ 9.3.1955, p. 28-31;
Rob Burns, Protest and Democracy in West Germany: Extra Parliamentary Opposition and the Democratic Agenda (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1988), 84.
77
DY 6 134, “Tagung des Nationalrats der Nationalen Front des Demokratischen Deutschland,” 9.3.1955, p. 1-31.
78
DY 6 134, “Entwurf: Appell an die Nation,” 9.3.1955, p. 3.
79
DY 30 87326, “Abschrift,” 17.8.1955.
80
DY 30 87326, “SPD - Funktionaere von NRW” - (10.12.59) – This document itself is from 1959, but its presumable that similar products existed before 1959 when East Germany operated more freely in the FRG.
81
DY 6 2163, “Betr: Bürobeschluss vom 22.11.1955 über die Verbreitung der
gesamtdeutschen Arbeit,” 27.12.1955.
82
NY 4182 1306, “Untitled, Berlin, den 12. Novbr. 1955.” 12.11.1955.
83
DY 6 190, “Protokoll der September Tagung,” 15.9.1955; DY 6 190, “Aufruf,” 15.9.1955.
84
DY 6 2168, “Grundsatzerklärung des Westdeutschen Arbeitsausschusses
der Nationalen Front,” 4.12.1955, p. 1-5.
85
DY 6 190, “Neujahrsaufruf des Praesidiums des Nationalrates der Nationalen Front des demokratischen Deutschland,” 29.12.1955, p.3-4.
86
Samuel Helfont, “Iraq’s Real Weapons of Mass Destruction Were ‘Political
Operations,’” War on the Rocks, February 26, 2018, https://warontherocks.
com/2018/02/iraqs-real-weapons-mass-destruction-political-operations/.
87
Hope Millard Harrison, Driving the Soviets Up The Wall: Soviet-East German
Relations, 1953-1961 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005), 29–30.

114

Cornell Overfield

All Quiet on the West German Front?
Images
Page 74: “Mao, Bulganin, Stalin, Ulbricht Tsedenbal,” (December 21,
1949), accessed on May 6, 2018 via Wikimedia Commons, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Mao,_Bulganin,_Stalin,_Ulbricht_Tsedenbal.
jpeg.
Page 82: “Leipzig, Herbstmesse, Pavillon der Nationalen Front,” photographed by Illner (September 2, 1953), accessed on May 6, 2018
via Wikimedia Commons https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/
File:Bundesarchiv_Bild_183-21044-0131,_Leipzig,_Herbstmesse,_Pavillon_der_Nationalen_Front.jpg.
Page 94: “Erich Correns,” photographed by Peter Heinz Junge (May 30,
1961), provided by the German Federal Archive, accessed on May 6,
2018 via Wikimedia Commons, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/
File:Bundesarchiv_Bild_183-83285-0022,_Erich_Correns.jpg.

Penn History Review

115

